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SOME ASPECTS OF COVERAGE OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT: WHAT IS "EMPLOYMENT"
PETER SEITZ*
As the Social Security program matures, practicing
attorneys find themselves called upon for advice concerning
that portion of the program relating to old age and survivors insurance. In many cases, the proper answer requires a careful analysis of the appropriate provisions of
the Federal statutes and the rules and regulations of the
Social Security Board comparable to the process of ascertaining rights and liabilities arising under a policy of insurance. There are no short cuts or easy paths to the determinations which must be made with respect to such problems. There are other inquiries of a broader nature, however, the answers to which may be found without too much
difficulty when the attorney has a sure grasp of fundamental coverage provisions of the Federal statutes and knows
where to look for the interpretative materials. It shall be
the purpose of this article to outline briefly and broadly
those conceptions of coverage which appear to be embodied
in the old-age and survivors insurance program and to comment upon the reasons which, apparently, actuated Congress
to cover certain groups and classes in the national population
and to exclude others.
The remarks which follow, of course, are not authoritative, many conclusions, particularly those with respect to
legislative intent, being based upon the mere speculation of
the writer. It is widely recognized in Anglo-American law
that whenever a statute is subject to construction, the intention of the legislature, always assuming that one existed,
can be declared with confidence and finality only by the
courts.
The Basic Statutory Provisions and the Interpretive
Materials Issued by Administrative Bodies
The Social Security program, insofar as it relates to
old-age and survivors insurance, and as presently consti*Principal Attorney, Federal Security Agency. The opinions expressed in this article are those of its author exclusively and
may not be attributed to the Federal Security Agency or the
Social Security Board.
(469)
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tuted, is legislatively expressed in the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (sub-chapter A of chapter 9 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, 26 U.S.C.A. 1400, et seq.) 1
and in title II of the Social Security Act, as amended, (42
U.S.C.A. 401, et seq.). The Federal Insurance Contributions
Act levies a tax on employees equal to a stated percentage
of "wages" 2 received by them with respect to "employment ' 3 (section 1400). The employees' tax is withheld from
the payroll by the employer and paid by him to the Collector
of Internal Revenue. The Federal Insurance Contributions
Act also levies an excise tax upon employers with respect to
having' individuals in their employ, equal to stated percentages of the wages paid by them with respect to employment
'As originally enacted the material of this subsection of the Internal
Revenue Code was contained in title VIII of the Social Security
Act of 1935. For reasons dictated, in all probability, by implications in the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) and Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) and. because of
constitutional uncertainties with respect to the scope and proper
exercise of the power of Congress to tax and to provide for the
general welfare (U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, section 8) the draftsmen
of the Act deemed it prudent not to provide expressly that the
funds collected through title VIII should be dedicated to the payment of benefits under title II. The tax and the spending provisions of the old age program were separately held to be valid,
in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), against an attack based
upon the theory that, in concert, they represented an unconstitutional exercise of power by Congress. There have been no judicial
attacks upon the affinity of the financing and spending features
of the old age program since Helvering v. Davis, supra, and the
controversy for all practical purposes, has been closed.
2 "Wages" is defined, generally, for the purposes of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (subchapter A of chapter 9 of the Internal
Revenue Code, as amended), title II of the Social Security Act
and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (subchapter C of chapter
9 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended) as "all remuneration
for employment including the cash value of all remuneration paid
in any medium other than cash." See Federal Insurance Contributions Act, section 1406 (a); Federal Unemployment Tax Act,
section 1607 (b) ; and title II of the Social Security Act, section
209 (a).
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act is the revenue
measure which permits credits to taxpayers who have contributed
to State unemployment compensation acts which conform to the
Federal standards prescribed therein. This act in many of its
coverage features is identical with the Federal Insurance Contributions Act. Its constitutionality was affirmed in Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). See also Carmichael v.
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
3"Employment" is defined, generally, for the purposes of the two
revenue laws and title II of the Social Security Act as "service
* * * by an employee for the person employing him." Federal
Insurance Contributions Act, section 1426(b); Federal Unemployment Tax Act, section 1609 (c); and title II of the Social Security
Act, as amended, section 209(b).
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(section 1410). A similar excise tax on employers is levied
by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (section 1600). For
the purposes of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, however, "employer" does not include any person unless, among
other things, the total number of persons employed by him
in employment for a specified period of time was eight or
more (section 1607).

Both the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act are administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue which has issued interpretative
4
regulations.
See Regulations 106 (Part 402, Title 26, Code of Federal Regulations,
1940 Supp.) relating to the Employees' tax and the Employers'
tax under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, U.S. Treasury
Dept., Bureau of Internal Revenue, 1940. See also Regulations
107 (Part 403, Title 26, Code of Federal Regulations, 1940 Supp.)
relating to the Excise Tax on Employers under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.
In addition to general regulations, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue issues precedent decisions in the Internal Revenue Bulletion, the official publication of the Bureau. These rulings are
designated "SST's." In litigation involving the application of
State unemployment compensation laws some of which contain
coverage and exemption language similar to or identical with the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act there has been evidenced a tendency of counsel to
rely upon these rulings of the Bureau as being authoritative
precedents which should govern judicial disposition of cases involving somewhat analogous facts. In many cases these "rulings"
which are merely digests of actual rulings, rendered anonymous by
deletion of identifying names, are well conceived and are of great
value to taxpayers and administrators. It might be well to observe,
however, that the following caveat appears on the face of the
Bulletin:
"The rulings reported in the Internal Revenue Bulletin are for the
information of taxpayers and their counsel as showing the trend
of official opinion in the administration of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; the rulings other than Treasury Decisions have none of
the force or effect of Treasury Decisions and do not commit the
Department to any interpretation of the law which has not been
formally approved and promulgated by the Secretary of the
Treasury. Each ruling embodies the administrative application of
the law and Treasury Decisions to the entire state of facts upon
which a particular case rests. It is especially to be noted that the
same result will not necessarily be reached in another case unless
all the material facts are identical with those of the reported case.
As it is not always feasible to publish a complete statement of
the facts underlying each ruling, there can be no assurance that
any new case is identical with the reported case. As bearing out
this distinction, it may be observed that the rulings published from
time to time may appear to reverse rulings previously published."
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that rulings
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue not promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury do not have the force and effect of Treasury
decisions and "are of little aid in interpreting a tax statute." See
Helvering v. N.Y. Trust Company, 292 U.S. 455, 467, 468 (1934);
Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 582 (1938); Estate of San-
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Title II of the Social Security Act, as amended, which
is administered by the Social Security Board, provides for
the payment to individuals who have attained the age of
65 of monthly benefits based upon their "average monthly
wage" in "employment", and for the payment of supplementary benefits to their wives, over 65, their minor children, dependent parents and widows.5 The Social Security
Board has issued as an interpretation of the Act which it
administers, Regulations No. 3 (Part 403, Title 20, Code of
Federal Regulations, 1940 Supp.) relating to Federal OldAge and Survivors Insurance under title II of the Social
Security Act, Federal Security Agency, Social Security
Board, 1940. The Board, however, has not, as yet, issued
any published rulings or interpretations indicating the trend
of its decisions comparable to those issued by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
The attention of an attorney engaged in a casual consideration of the program is soon attracted to the circumstance that with regard to the meaning of such key terms
as "wages" and "employment", the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for revenue collection purposes, and the Social Security
Board, for benefit payment purposes, issue their own independent regulations and rulings. Further inspection will
reveal that in all material respects the cited regulations of
these respective agencies of the Federal Government, dealing
with these provisions, are identical. The regulations themselves, however, are, of course, subject to construction and
interpretation, and there is no assurance that these agencies
will achieve the same results in their rulings. A determination as to whether certain payments constitute "wages" or
whether the performance of certain services evidences the
relationship of "employment" depends largely upon the extent of development of the relevant facts. A deficiency of
such development in a given case, or a tendency of one agency
to give more weight than the other to the criteria of deterford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 52 (1939). See also for the
attitude of State courts with respect to the weight to be accorded
rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue as binding precedents,
Capitol Building & Loan Assn. v. Kansas Commissioner of Labor
and Industry, 148 Kan. 446, 83 P. (2d) 106 (1938); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Hines, 10 A. (2d) 553 (Pa. 1940).
5 This broad description comprehends all of the types of benefits payable under title II as amended in 1939. The benefits in the Social
Security Act of 1935 were of a much more restrictive nature.

EMPLOYMENT

mination outlined in the regulations might well result in
opposite conclusions on an identical state of facts. It is
doubtful whether the rule of res judicata is sufficiently
flexible and elastic to enable a company to claim that an administrative or judicial decision with respect to its Social
Security tax liability is determinative of the merits of a
claim of its former employee for benefits, or to enable the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to claim that an administrative
or judicial decision allowing a claim for title II benefits
to a former employee of a company is determinative of a
suit by the company for refund of the Social Security taxes
it had paid. The dichotomy in the Social Security program
which resulted from reasonably held constitutional doubts
thus presents a situation wherein, theoretically, under iden.
tical coverage and exemption provisions, that agency which
pays out benefits may reach a conclusion as to whether the
relationship of "employment" is present, contrary to that
of the agency charged with the collection of the tax. In
practice, however, it is believed to be fair to state that such
differences of viewpoint with respect to general interpretation and application of the statutes as may have arisen between the two agencies have been minimized and depreciated. A system of coordination of activities and mutual consideration of the problems shared by the Social Security
Board and the Bureau of Internal Revenue may have the
consequence, ultimately, of dispelling all substantial differences of interpretation.
The Meaning and Scope of "Employment"
It will be observed that the payment of the various types
of benefits provided for by section 202 of title II of the
Social Security Act, as amended, 6 depends upon the identity
e Section 202(a) provides for primary insurance benefits (payable
monthly) to individuals who are "fully insured" (as defined in
section 209(g)) and have attained the age of 65. Section 202(b)
provides for monthly payments to a wife of a fully insured individual provided she attained the age of 65, is living with her husband or is regularly supported by him and is not entitled to
primary benefits on her own account. Section 202(c) provides
for payments to children of individuals entitled to primary benefits
or who are fully insured provided they satisfy the statutory test
of dependency. Section 202(d) provides for payments to a widow
of a fully insured individual living with him at the time of his
death or regularly supported by him, when she attains the age of
65 and is not entitled to benefits on her own account. Section
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of the claimant as or his relationship to a "fully insured
individual" (section 209 (g)) or a "currently insured individual" (section 209 (b) ). Such individuals are defined as
individuals who had been paid "wages" of a specified amount
for a minimum specified period. "Wages" in turn is defined in section 209(a) as "all remuneration for employment"; and, finally, "employment" (with certain exceptions
thereafter set forth) is defined in section 209 (b) as "any
service of whatsoever nature, performed . . . by an employee for the person employing him . . . ." Thus, any inquiry as to whether an individual is or will be entitled to
benefits depends upon whether he is receiving remuneration
for services performed by him as an employee of another.
The employment relationship as the test of coverage
of the Social Security program was hardly chosen because
that relationship comprehends with satisfactory precision
those groups which are most in need of the security afforded
by the statute. The employment relation was chosen because, relatively better than any other group concept, it includes those sought to be protected. The statements in the
Report to the President of the Committee on Economic Security, the reports of the House and Senate Committees which
recommended the legislation to Congress and the statements
of the Supreme Court as to the probable Congressional intent are revealing on this point.7 They disclose that it was
202(e) provides for payments to a widow of an individual who
was either fully or currently insured, who was living with her
husband at the time of his death and who, at the time she applied
for benefits, had, in her case, a child of her husband entitled to
child's benefits. Section 202(f) provides for payments to parents
of individuals who died fully insured and who were wholly dependent upon such individuals. Section 202 (g) provides for lump
sum payments to designated relatives or to individuals bearing
funeral expenses on the account of fully or currently insured persons who died after December 31, 1939 leaving no widow, child or
parent entitled to a monthly benefit.
No attempt is made in this footnote to set forth all of the
qualifying conditions set forth in the cited sections. The reader
is referred to the statute and the regulations for that purpose.
The amount of benefit payments depends upon the average
monthly wage of the insured individual (section 209(f)), the
number of years $200 or more of wages were paid to such individual (section 209 (e)) and other factors set forth in the
provisions relating to the various types of benefits.
7 In Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937),
Mr. Justice Stone said at p. 512:
"The character of the exemptions suggests simply that the state
has chosen as the subject of its tax, those who employ labor in the
processes of industrial production and distribution."
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the Congressional purpose to extend the benefits of the
Act to the vast number of workers, primarily industrial,
whose economic survival rests upon the continuance of an
association with an entrepreneur assuring the payment of
wages as remuneration for services performed.

It was as-

sumed that the individuals in this class and their families
were in need of protection against the vicissitudes attending
old age and death. It may be that objective criteria might
have been devised that would enable an administrative official with greater certainty and dispatch to identify those
whom the Congress sought to make secure and to protect
against the hazards of old age and unemployment, but the
draftsmen of the Act, apparently, came to the conclusion,
either that the search for such criteria would be in vain, or
that they might best be declared after the program had developed, and experience had indicated where the line should
be drawn.
The employment relation, then, was chosen, apparently,
not because it was considered the best possible criterion of
coverage, but because it appeared the best practicable standard then available. Certainly it cannot be said that it bears
any close and necessary relationship to the risk of insecurity
attending old age and unemployment or to the risk of insecurity faced by the survivors of the deceased family breadwinner; those risks appear to be common to individuals and
to their survivors without regard to the technical legal circumstances under which their services are performed. Penury in old age and insecurity of "employment" in its broadest sense are hazards faced by the factor, the independent
contractor, the consignee, the lessee, the dealer, the distributor and the professional man as well as the "servant1 ' at
common law.
It appears wholly reasonable and in conformity with
should be applied in most tort cases. This is because we
our national mores that the rule of respondeat superior
believe it to be proper and just that he should be held
responsible for the damage who controls the actions
and conduct of another, performing services for him. This
is because the owner of the business, the entrepreneur,
the hirer of services is usually, of all the parties concerned,
in the best position to minimize the risk of injury to a third
person by the installation of safety devices, the prescription
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of safety rules, etc. Furthermore, he is probably in the best
position to shift or absorb the damage and social loss that
has been occasioned." This rationale also justifies placing
the burden of workmen's compensation insurance upon the
employer (master). In the field of old-age and survivors
insurance and in unemployment compensation, however, it
is obvious that the factor of "control" which is one of the
principal tests of the existence of the master-servant relationship in connection with ex delicto or workmen's compensation liability, is entirely irrelevant. The risks and hazards sought to be dealt with in the social security program
are neither diminished nor augmented by the exercise or the
reservation of the right of "control" by him for whom the
services are performed.
It will be observed that the benefits payable are measured by "wages" paid. Title II of the act as well as the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act is geared to wage payments. It was obviously contemplated that so-called "self-employed" individuals
would not come within its scope. The reasons which would
justify the implied exclusion of self-employed individuals are
twofold: First, a self-employed individual is frequently
thought of as being in a better position to insulate himself
against insecurity in old age than the typical wage-earner;
profits are more flexible than wages, and afford a better
opportunity to the entrepreneur to attain security than to
the wage-earner who must depend upon the continuous ren8 See

Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an

Independent Contractor (1935) 10 Ind. L. J. 494; HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1933) sec. 291; Steffen, Independent
Contractor and the Good Life (1935) 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 501; Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916) 26 Yale L. J.105; Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk (1929) 38

Yale L. J.584.
with compulsory coverage large groups of workers cannot
readily be brought under unemployment compensation; among them
employees in very small establishments, and, of course, all self

0"Even

employed persons." (Italics supplied) Report to the President of
the Committee on Economic Security, p. 10 (1935).

See also computations and tables in Report No. 628 of Senate

Committee on Finance, May 13, 1935 (to accompany H.R. 2760) pp.
26, 27 and Report No. 615, of House Committee on Ways and
Means, April 5, 1935 (to accompany H.R. 7260) pp. 14, 15 which

indicate that in addition to the specially exclued types of service
(agricultural labor, government service, etc.) it was intended by
Congress that the individuals not within the coverage of title VIII

and title IX of the original act would be "owners, operators, selfemployed (including the professions)."
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dition of services. 0 Secondly, as a supplement to the system
applicable to the wage-earning population of the country,
it was originally planned that a voluntary system of old age
annuities would be put into execution by the sale to individuals, on a cost basis, of deferred life annuities. In its
Report to the President (1935) the Committee on Economic
Security stated that "The primary purpose of the [voluntary]
plan is to offer persons not included within the compulsory
system a systematic and safe method of providing for their
old age." This plan, which was to take in the "self-employed", was set forth in title XI of H.R. 7260, but was not,
however, enacted as a part of the Social Security Act of 1935.
It becomes evident that in expressing the fundamental
coverage concept of title II in terms of employment the
framers and enactors of the legislation appeared to be concerned, not so much with "employees" or "servants" in the
sense that those terms are used in tort and workmen's compensation cases, as with "labor in the processes of industrial
production and distribution,"" as distinguished from "selfemployed" individuals. This conception expressed, perhaps,
not so clearly as might be desired was embodied in Regulations No. 3 (Part 403, title 20, Code of Federal Regulations,
1940 Supp.) of the Social Security Board. It is there stated:
"Generally, physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, contractors, subcontractors, public stenographers, auctioneers, and
others who follow an independent trade, business, or profession, in which they offer their services to the public, are inde(Italics supplied)
pendent contractors and not employees."
(Sec. 403.804)

The regulations also contain the statement that:
"Generally such relationship (employer and employee) exists
when the person for whom services are performed has the
right to control and direct the individual who performs the
services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the
101A considerable part of the population, however, is outside of title

IL Included in this excluded group are all agricultural workers
* * * all self-employed persons, farmers, professional people, and
proprietors and entrepreneurs. These groups include almost half
of all persons 'gainfully occupied' as the term is used in the United
States Census. Many of these people will not be so greatly in
need of old age assistance as the industrial workers to whom title
II is applicable, but large numbers are likely to be dependent upon
the public in their old age." (Report No. 628, Senate Committee
on Finance, May 13, 1935, p. 9).
13 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 512 (1937).

478
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work but also as to the details and means by which that result
is accomplished."
(See. 403.804)

It is believed that it is reasonable to conclude that the regulations justify an interpretation of the term "employment"
which would exclude individuals typically self-employed "who
follow an independent trade, business or profession in which
they offer their services to the public" and that one of the
principal tests in ascertaining whether such a situation exists is whether the individual performing the services is subject to a right of control and direction by another, not only
as to the result of the work but "as to the details and means"
by which it is accomplished.
It may be complained that this unduly subordinates the
"control test" in the ascertainment of the employment relationship. The Restatement of the Law of Agency, 12 however,
only considers the "control test" but one of eight criteria
for the master-servant relationship.' Moreover, on historical
grounds it has been ably argued by Professor Paul A. Leidy"
on the basis of the leading and significant case of Milligan
v. Wedge14 that the severity of the respondeat superior rule
of liability which is a rule of absolute liability, was relaxed
principally where it was found that the person performing
the tortious act did so, not as one who was a part of the
principal's business establishment and staff, but as one who
held himself out to the public as pursuing an independent
calling, profession or occupation. The control test has also
been subjected to severe criticism as the exclusive or paramount factor in the ascertainment of the relationship, by
Professor Fowler V. Harper, 5 Professor Roscoe T. Steffen 16
and Professor, now Justice William 0. Douglas. 7
On the basis of these studies, the interpretation of the
regulations suggested above, would not appear to be unreasonable. Whether it will be adopted, ultimately, by the
12

RESTATEMENT, AGENCY

(1933)

§220.

"3Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors (1930) 28 Mich. Law
Rev. 365.
1l 12 Ad. & E 737 (Q.B. 1840)
13 Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor (1935) 10 Ind. L. J. 494; HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW oF TORTS (1933) sec. 291.
16 Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life (1935) 2 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 501.
7 Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk (1929)
38 Yale L. J. 584-604, 720-745.
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courts remains to be seen. The litigation respecting the social security program in the Federal courts has not yet been
sufficiently extensive to hazard any prophesy whether the
courts in social security cases will be able to overcome the
natural tendency to fall into the error of using the traditional and familiar criteria for ascertaining whether, for
the purpose of determining vicarious liability in tort, the

employer-employee relationship exists. The United States
District Court in Kaus v. Huston-8 evidenced its ability to
avoid the mental pitfalls in a case in which the owner of a
fleet of taxicabs who allegedly "leased" them to drivers for

stated periods at a stated "rental" sued for refund of social
security taxes on the ground that the drivers did not perform

services in "employment."

The court said at p. 331:

" ... By narrow technical analysis of such relationship and
particularly plaintiff's claimed want of control over the
drivers, it is argued that the relationship of master and servant does not exist. It seems to me that this view of the question is too narrow. The real question for solution is, Does
the plaintiff engage merely in the leasing of taxicabs, or does
he operate a line of taxicabs as a common carrier of passengers? When all factors are considered and particularly the
contractual relationship of the plaintiff with the passengers
carried, I think there can be little doubt that plaintiff is operating the line of taxicabs, and that while he has adopted an
ingenious method of fixing the compensation of his drivers and
permits the drivers to exercise some discretion over the cab
during the period of the driver's shift, nevertheless I think
there is no discretion vested in the drivers inconsistent with
the relation of master and servant. From the very nature
of the case the drivers, in order to perform their duties properly, must exercise very complete control over the cabs while
they have them on their shifts."19
1835 F.

Supp. 327 (D.C. Iowa 1940).

")Notwithstanding an insistence by some courts that the employment
relationship does not exist unless there is shown a right to control
the "details" and means by which the desired result is to be
accomplished, Luckie v. Diamond Coal Co., 41 Calif. App. 468,
480, 183 Pac. 178, 183 (1919), other courts with, perhaps, a
clearer perception of the fundamentals and character of the relation, are satisfied with a showing of a right of "general control"
over the activities of the alleged employee. Aisenberg v. C. F.
Adams Company Inc., 95 Conn. 418, 111 At]. 591 (1920); Jack and
Jill, Inc. v. Tone, 9 A.(2d)497(Conn. 1939); cf Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo.
550, 88 P. (2d) 560 (1939). The "general control" test, of course,
in application, reaches practically the same results as the test of
whether the individuals performing services "follow an independent trade, business or profession in which they offer their services
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The case has been appealed by the employer to the Circuit Court of Appeals and a decision is expected by the time
this article is published.o In Indian Refining Co. v. Dallman 2l and in The Texas Co. v. Higgins22 in which the oil
company plaintiffs sought refund of social security taxes
paid with respect to services performed by bulk station operators, however, a more restrictive approach with emphasis
upon the "control test" was evidenced by the respective
courts.
In The Texas Company case, furthermore, Judge Learned
Hand speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals said:
to the public" (Regulations No. 3 of Social Security Board, section
403-804) inasmuch as it is only those who are free of the "general
control" of those for whom services are performed who may be
said to follow an independent trade, etc.
Furthermore, it is of interest to note that adoption of either
of these tests as distinguished from the test of control as to the
"details" of performance, tends to result in a recognition of the
employment relation where services are necessarily performed under
conditions which require discretion with respect to "details" to be
lodged in the alleged employee. The language from Kaus v. Huston,
quoted above, is evidence of this tendency, and in Allied Mutuals
Liability Co. v. DeJong, 209 App. Div. 505, 205 N.Y. Supp. 165
(1924) in which an industrial homeworker was held to be an
employee within the scope of the State workmen's compensation
law, it was said:
"One may be sent into a forest to fell trees, or be sent to his home
to sew garments, and in either case be none the less an employee.
If the employer chooses to order work so done as to waive supervision, this does not make the employee less an employee." (p. 167)
See also Fischer v. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 621, 629, 134 N.E.
114, 117 (1922); Andrews v. Commodore Knitting Mills Inc., 257
App. Div. 515, 13 N.Y.S. (2d) 577, 579 (1939).
20A similar approach was evidenced by the Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut in Robert C. Buell & Co. v. Danaher, Conn. 18 A.
(2d) 697 (Conn. 1941) in which it was held, under the Connecticut unemployment compensation law which defines "employment"
in terms of the existence of the master-servant relationship, that
security salesmen for a brokerage partnership were "servants."
The court said at p. 699:
"'On the whole the work which the salesmen are doing is the
business of the plaintiff. The advancement of that business depends
very largely upon the method and manner of the doing of their
work by the salesmen. It is therefore highly essential to the
plaintiff that it have the right to control the conduct of its salesmen in the doing of its business and it accordingly must be inferred in reason that it is implicit in the contract of hiring the
salesmen that the plaintiff does have that right. And certainly the
plaintiff has the power to enforce that right in that it holds over
the salesmen the threat of discharge if they do not do their work
to the satisfaction of the plaintiff."
2 31 F. Supp. 455 (S.D. Ill. 1940) (aff'd., C.C.A.Tth, 1941).
22118 F. (2d) 636 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) aff'g 32 F. Supp 428 (S.D.N.Y.

1940).
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" . . . the act appears to take over the term as the common
law knew it, and at common law they would not be employees."

Although the rules for the ascertainment of the employment relationship in New York (where the case was
tried and the alleged employer was situated) and in Virginia (where the alleged employee performed his services)
may not differ materially, reference to "the common law"
as a governing standard may result in opening up a Pandora's box of questions as to conflicts of laws in other cases.
Furthermore, it was clearly stated in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins 23 "there is no federal general common law"
and that "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the State." If Judge Hand meant to
refer to the common law of the State, the effect of his decision, it seems, would be to import into the social security
program a diversity of rules and a lack of uniformity of
standards of coverage which
could hardly have been intended
4
in a national program.2
On the other hand, if Judge Hand meant to refer to a
Federal common law of "employment", what of Mr. Justice
Brandeis' declaration of its non-existence? It may be considered to be unfair, of course, to subject a casual and unfortunate expression in a judicial opinion to the test of syllogistic logic which is carefully rigged to demonstrate its
absurdity. The view may be taken that, in referring to the
"common law", Judge Hand meant those decisions of the
Federal courts antedating the enactment of the Social Se23 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)

_-IFor the purpose of ascertaining familial relationships (wife, widow,
child, or parent of an insured individual) Congress specified that
the Social Security Board should apply "such law as would be
applied in determining the devolution of interestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is
domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such
insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he
was domiciled at the time of his death, or if such insured individual
is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District
of Columbia." Social Security Act as amended, section 209(m);
Regulations No. 3, Social Security Board, section 403.829. Congress,
therefore, clearly evidenced its intention that State rules should be
determinative as to designated issues of coverage. Its failure to
refer to State rules with respect to "employment" may, therefore,
be taken to mean that it intended uniform application of one national rule. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938); Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932); Morgan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 309 U.S. 7/8, 80 (1940); Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 118 (1940); National Labor Relations Board v.
Waterman Steamship Co., 309 U.S. 206, 219 (1940).
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curity Act involving the scope of the relationship of "employment" and of "employer" and "employee" which Congress had in mind on the occasion of its passage. Unfortunately, this rationalization is partially affected by the circumstance that aside from a very few cases such as Singer
Sewing Machine Co. v. Rahn,25 and cases involving the construction of those terms as they appear in statutes, 2 there
has been no satisfactory development and adjudication of the
meaning of "employment", "employer" and "employee" by
the Federal courts.2 7 In that event, it would appear that the
correct interpretation of those terms as they appear in the
Social Security Act depends upon the administrative and
judicial determination of the legislative intention-the ascertainment of those individuals whom Congress believed to be
most in need of protection against the hazards of old age
and death 28 and the payment of benefits to whom would
serve the general welfare.
In other words, the use of these terms in the Social
Security Act does not necessarily bind its interpreters to the
construction of similar terms in other statutes designed to
remedy other mischiefs and enacted for other purposes.2 9
The interpreters, it is believed, are free to cover such groups
in their general regulations and rulings as would appear to
them to have been comprehended by the legislative intention, even though under a Federal common law judicially
declared to be non-existent, and under State court decisions
dealing with other problems and matters, individuals sim25 132 U.S. 518 (1889).
26 "Statutes have been passed in which the words 'servant' and 'agent'
have been used. The context and purpose of the particular statute
controls the meaning which is frequently not that which the same
word bears in the Restatement of this subject." RESTATEMENT
AGENCY (1933) (comment on sec. 220 d).
27 "Where the term 'employee' has been used in statutes without particularized definition it has not been treated by the courts as a word
of definite content." U.S. v. American Trucking Associations,
Inc., 310 U.S. 534, fn. 29 (1940).
28 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S.
50 (1926); South
Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940).
29 "The word ['employee'] of course, is not a word of art.
It takes

color from its surroundings and frequently is carefully defined by
the statute where it appears." (U.S. v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 545 (1940).

"That the word 'employees' is not treated by Congress as a word
of art having a definite meaning is apparent from an examination
of recent legislation" (citing, among other statutes, the Social
Security Act). (U.S. v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310

U.S. 534, fn. 29 (1940).
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ilarly circumstanced might not have been considered to be
in employment.
The employment relation referred to in the Social Security Act is not easily defined and described by reference
to tort cases or to workmen's compensation cases. In those
cases, the term "independent contractor" is too frequently
used as a mere label indicating non-liability of a principal
for the infliction of a specific wrong even though the general relationship of employment might otherwise exist between the wrongdoer and the principal2 ° For social security purposes, in view of its taxing and benefit features,
it is necessary to know whether the general status of employment exists. Knowledge that at a particular instant of
time the individual performing services proceeded on a frolic
and detour and went beyond the scope of his employment or
knowledge as to the extent of "control" by the alleged employer over the instrumentality that occasioned a tort is of
no assistance in determining tax liability or benefit entitlement which must necessarily depend upon a "flow-of-time"
20 Compare,

Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909);
American Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Riplinger, 249 Ky. 83, 60
S.W. (2d) 115 (1933); Weslowski v. John Hancock Mutual Ins. Co.,
308 Pa. 117, 162 At. 166 (1932).
For example, S, a distributor of the D Company's products
who uses his own automobile, with the Company's approval, causes
an injury to P due to his negligence. A court might reach the
conclusion that at the moment of the impact S was not engaged
in the business of the D Company, or that the D Company did not
reserve, in the contract of employment, a right to control the
operation of the car. This conclusion will usually be articulated
by using the label "independent contractor," which, in turn, indicates
the nonapplicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior. In
other words the D Company is not liable to P in damages.
In all other respects, however, and excepting for the circumstances appertaining to the particular accident, it is fair to assume
that S was and continues to be an employee of the D Company and
not an independent contractor. Certainly it is difficult to understand why an adjudication of rights in the tort action should
militate against S's claim when, upon attaining the age of 65, he
applies for old age benefits based upon services in the employ of
the D Company.
The irrelevance of the concept "independent contractor" in legislation with a particular social purpose was clearly recognized by
the Supreme Court of Indiana in McDowell v. Duer, 78 Ind. App.
440, 133 N.E. 839 (1922) in which a timber cutter for a hoop
manufacturing company was held to be an "employee" within
the meaning of a workmen's compensation law. The court said at
p. 840:
"The doctrine of 'independent contractor' is peculiar to the law
of negligence, and we are not aware that it is appropriate to any
other branch of the law. Certainly it has no place in the law of
workmen's compensation. We will eliminate that term, therefore,
from further consideration."
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conception. Regard for the remedial purposes of the program requires the adoption of an interpretation and construction of "employment" which will be practicable and
workable and will achieve the legislative intention by bringing the benefits of the act to those who, it was believed, are
in ,need of them. It is felt that emphasis upon the factor
of the absence of an independent calling or business rather
than upon the "control test" meets those requirements. It
is by application of such a criterion that most "wage earners"
will be covered, and most "self-employed" excluded from
the benefits of the act and, of course, from the operation
of the appropriate provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
There is no clear line of demarcation, however, between the
fields of coverage and non-coverage, and it is doubtful
whether the ingenuity of bill-drafters is sufficient to devise
objective criteria which will clarify the existing uncertainties. The program is in the hands of the courts, and it is
their construction of the statutory language that will determine its future. The only prophesy that can be made with
confidence is that if the courts are restrictive in their interpretation of "employment"31 legislative amendments will be
demanded by the people of this country to expand the coverage of the Social Security Act and to express the criteria
of coverage in terms other than a formula of relevance and
81

Liberal construction, of course, does not contemplate a perversion of
the provisions of the act: it calls for an interpretation, in doubtful
cases, harmonious with the legislative intention rather than one
based upon supposed analogies in -nreviously decided cases.

Thus,

in connection with the canons of construction applicable to the
Indiana worlamen's compensation act, it was said in Dietrich, et al.

v. Smith, 93 Ind. App. 219, 176 N.E. 636 (1931):
"It was undoubtedly the humane purposes which were sought
to be incorporated into our law, and the correction of some evils
then existing, that prompted the Legislature to enact the 'Workman's Compensation Act'. So the courts have held that such laws
should be liberally construed, in order that the purpose of their
enactment should not be thwarted, 'even to the inclusion of cases
within the reason although outside the letter of the statute.' Furthermore: 'This court is committed to the proposition that in construing the legislative definition of "employee" a measure of liberality should be indulged in, to the end that in doubtful cases an
injured workman or his dependents may not be deprived of the
benefits of the humane provisions of the compensation plan.'
Columbia, etc., Co. v. Lewis (1916) 63 Ind. App. 386, 115 N.E. 103;
In re Duncan (1930) 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N.E. 289, 291; McDowell
v. Duer (1922) 78 Ind. App. 440, 133 N.E. 839, 841; Calumet, etc.,
Machine Co. v. Mroz (1922) 79 Ind. App. 305, 137 N.E. 627;
National Power, etc., Co. v. Rouleau (1924) 81 Ind. App. 585, 144
N.E. 557; Dowery v. State (1925) 84 Ind. App. 37, 149 N.E. 922;
Fey v. Bobrink (1926) 84 Ind. App. 559, 151 N.E. 705." (p. 637)
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use only in the field of tort law. It may be anticipated, perhaps, that some restrictive interpretations will result from
litigation involving the taxing provisions; however, when
the benefit claims denied by the Social Security Board are
appealed to the courts, a swing in the other direction may
likewise be anticipated.
The treatment by the courts of this great social program which assures security to wage-earners in their old
age and to their dependents after death is worthy of the
continued interest of every practicing lawyer. The law is
being interpreted in the courts today. That law as interpreted will affect the lives and happiness of millions of our
people.

